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Directors and officers of an insolvent corporation face considerable un-
certainty in embarking on a voyage through the bankruptcy process. In these
uncharted waters, many such professionals view their company's directors' and
officers' liability insurance policy (D&O coverage) as a life-raft providing in-
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demnification for liability resulting from a leadership misjudgment. Owing to
the Delaware Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Bridgeport Holdings,1
the risk that a director or officer will be found liable for guiding a company as-
tray during a bankruptcy proceeding is enhanced. Thus, sufficient D&O cover-
age is essential for corporations entering restructuring or liquidation.
Even if sufficient insurance coverage exists, bankruptcy presents a risk
that an insurer will deny D&O coverage under an exclusion in the policy. Ex-
clusions are contractual provisions that describe situations in which a policy of
2insurance will not respond to a claim. For example, many homeowners insur-
ance policies do not provide coverage for damages arising from pollution or
flood situations. D&O insurance policies frequently exclude coverage for em-
ployment, intellectual property, and personal injury claims.4 In addition, D&O
insurers routinely disallow indemnity when one insured party brings an action
against another insured party under an "insured vs. insured" exclusion.' This
particular exclusion is often implicated in a bankruptcy proceeding because of
the possibility that the administrator of a bankruptcy estate will be deemed an
"insured" by the court.6 In that event, coverage will be barred, potentially leav-
ing the corporate officials named in the underlying suit with significant personal
liability.7
1 388 B.R. 548 (Bankr. D. Del., 2008).
2 ROBERT H. JERRY 1i, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 424 (3d ed. 2002) (citing Spencer
Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance
Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 496 (1961)). Exclusions "carve out areas in the affirmative grant of
coverage where no coverage will be provided." Id.
3 See, e.g., Wallis v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 723 N.E.2d 376, 383 (111. 2000) (interpreting the
meaning and scope of a flood exclusion in a homeowners insurance policy); St. Paul Fire & Ma-
rine Ins. Co. v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co.. 664 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. 111. 1987).
4 See Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Yacht Club, 742 A.2d 79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1999) (addressing an employment exclusion); Bd. of Managers v. Fed. Ins. Co., 669 N.Y.S.2d 332
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (interpreting a property damage exclusion).
5 See Murray v. Loewen Group, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117 (E.D. Wis. 2001). The purpose
underlying the exclusion is to prevent collusion, "such as suits in which a corporation sues its
officers and directors in an effort to recoup the consequences of their business mistakes ... thus
turning liability insurance into business-loss insurance .... " Level 3 Conmc'ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins.
Co., 168 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 1999): see also Twp. of Center. Butler County, Pa. v. First Mer-
cury Syndicate. Inc., 117 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The primary focus of the exclusion is to
prevent collusive suits in which an insured company might seek to force its insurer to pay for the
poor business decisions of its officers or managers.").
6 See Catherine E. Vance & Geoffrey L. Berman, Last in Line: Do "Insured vs. Insured"
Exclusions Apply to Assignees in Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors?. 23 AM. BANIR. INST.
J. 12 (Feb. 2004).
7 See generally Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnifi-
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Courts have reached different results when considering whether admin-
istrators associated with a bankrupt corporation are precluded from seeking cov-
erage by an "insured vs. insured" exclusion.' The lack of judicial consensus
results partly because cogent analytical tools are not presently available to
courts in applying the exclusion to a constituent 9 in bankruptcy. 10 Currently,
courts consider a handful of relevant factors, employing inconsistent rationales
in reaching their decisions. ' The absence of uniform analytical guidelines leads
different courts to render varying and sometimes irreconcilable opinions when
considering similar facts.
To assist courts in creating a cogent and consistent framework, this Ar-
ticle proposes an analytical methodology that fuses the bodies of insurance and
bankruptcy law. By creating an environment in which courts give effect to the
objectives of both systems, the proposed framework seeks to provide direction
to litigants, bankruptcy judges, and drafters of D&O policies who require guid-
ance in the contract's formative stages. If adopted, the proposed analysis will
8 See Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D. Del. 2002) (finding that
the "insured vs. insured" exclusion should not apply to claims brought by a bankruptcy Estate
Representative against the former directors and officers of the Debtor where the Debtor is the
insured entity, because the Debtor's Estate Representative ...and the Debtor . . .are separate
entities."); Am. Cas. Co. of Reading Pa. v. Sentry Federal Savings Bank. 867 F.Supp. 50 (D.
Mass. 1994) (finding that a conservator of a receivership's claims asserted against directors and
officers of a receivership were not barred from coverage under "insured vs. insured" exclusion as
the conservator was not the "Institution" named in the policy); In re Pintlar Corp., 205 B.R. 945
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1997) (finding that litigation trustees who were not acting for the benefit of the
corporation but for the benefit of the corporation's creditors and thus their claims against former
officers and directors were not barred from coverage under "insured vs. insured" exclusion found
in Chapter 11 debtors' insurance policy, but trustees acting on behalf of the debtor itself could not
bring covered claims). But see In re R.J. Reynolds, 315 B.R. 674 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2003) (finding
that bankruptcy trustee's suit against debtor's former officers was brought as assignee and was
excluded under "insured vs. insured" exclusion); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Olympia Holding
Corp., No. 1:94-CV-2081, 1996 WL 33415761 (N.D. Ga. June 4, 1996) (finding a bankruptcy
trustee's claims against the former officers were excluded under the "insured vs. insured" exclu-
sion as the trustee "can only assert claims against insureds that belong to" the company and thus
"there is no legal distinction between the trustee and the company); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Weis, 148
B.R. 575 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (finding that a plan constituent of bankrupt corporation's action against
former officers of bankrupt corporation was excluded from coverage under "insured vs. insured"
exclusion as action was on the behalf of bankrupt corporation) Powell v. American Cas. Co. of
Reading Pa., 772 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (finding that an "insured vs. insured"
exclusion applied to claims which arose when the FDIC brought an action against former directors
and officers of a bank as the FDIC "stands in the shoes of the Security Bank in prosecuting
claims.").
9 The term "constituent" shall be used throughout this Article to refer to the administrator of a
bankruptcy estate, such as a debtor-in-possession, a bankruptcy trustee, or a creditors' committee.
10 Michael J. Sousa, Making Sense of the Bramble-Filled Thicket: The "Insured vs. Insured"
Exclusion in the Bakruptcy Context, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 404 (2007) ("[T]here is pre-
sently an inconsistent application of the 'insured vs. insured' exclusion in the bankruptcy con-
text.").
I d. at 10. Sousa's article is discussed at length in Section ii, infra.
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still the uncharted waters, adding a measure of predictability to the sea of ques-
tions companies face in traversing through a perilous bankruptcy proceeding.
Part I of this Article provides a brief explanation of the purpose behind
D&O policies and the insurer's reasons for including "insured vs. insured" pro-
visions. Part II explains how the recent holding in In re Bridgeport Holdings
amplifies the potential for a finding of D&O liability in the context of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, thereby increasing the probability that "insured vs. insured"
exclusions will be implicated in future cases. Part III examines the inconsistent
interpretation of such exclusions heretofore employed by various courts, specif-
ically regarding whether a debtor-in-possession, a bankruptcy trustee, or a credi-
tors' committee is considered an "insured" for the purpose of the exclusion.
Part IV proposes a framework for applying the "insured vs. insured" exclusion
in bankruptcy cases based on the characteristics and role of each constituent
according to bankruptcy law. The test sets forth the appropriate presumption to
be employed as to each bankruptcy constituent, and identifies two important
factors to be considered in rebutting the presumption.
PART I. DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE
"INSURED VS. INSURED" EXCLUSION
In the words of Professor Spencer Kimball, "[i]nsurance is a small
world that reflects the purposes of the larger world outside it.' 2 It should come
as no surprise, then, that our larger world's economic evolution has caused pa-
rallel adaptations in the business of insurance. 13 Expanding commercial vitality
produces novel risks, and insurance responds in kind by providing ways in
which we manage them. 4 Evidence of the symbiosis of commerce and insur-
ance was observable in the early maritime economy, where seafaring vessels
were the engines of prosperity.' 5 Merchants recognized the importance of enter-
ing into mutual aid agreements to spread the risk of goods being lost at sea so
that no individual merchant would be forced to bear the entire financial injury
resulting from a jettison. 16 The benefits of this form of risk-distribution "were
so obvious that it became the equivalent of an implied term in all maritime ship-
ping ventures."
1 7
12 JERRY, supra note 2, at 20 (citing Spencer Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 524 (1961)).
13 See generally WILLIAM D. WINTER, MARINE INSURANCE: ITS PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 9 31
(3d. ed., 1952).
14 TOM BAIaR, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 8 12 (2003).
15 JERRY, supra note 2, at 20-22 (discussing mutual aid arrangements whereby each maritime
merchant would contribute pro rata to the loss of the merchant whose goods were tossed over-
board in the event of jettison).
16 Id.
17 ld. at 21.
[Vol. 112
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Another implied term in early maritime insurance embodied the necessi-
ty for able leadership aboard merchant vessels. In 1811, a Massachusetts court
discussed the implicit duty of care and diligence that was owed by holders of
maritime insurance policies:
It is the duty of the owner [of the vessel] to see that he entrusts
the property insured with a man of competent skill, prudence,
and discretion. He is responsible for all losses or damage to the
goods committed to his charge, which arise from his negli-
gence, ignorance, or willful misconduct .... The principle of an
implied warranty on the part of the assured, that every thing
shall be done to prevent a loss, pervades the whole subject of
marine insurance .... 18
Thus, early maritime insurance effectively distributed many risks of
commercial voyage and demanded the utmost in responsible conduct from those
who took a vessel's helm.
Today, corporations drive commercial progress. 19 Each depends upon
its leaders to navigate through the often hostile conditions of a highly integrated
market economy, where rapid decision-making and swift action are essential to
achieving financial viability for every major business organization. Like sea
captains who traversed the oceans in the early nineteenth century, today's cor-
porate leaders owe specific duties to the enterprise, and may be held personally
liable if their actions breach those obligations.20
As Professor Kimball would predict, insurance law in the United States
has acclimated to the risk that the negligence of corporate directors and officers
may result in liability.2 1 Over the course of several decades, directors' and of-
18 Cleveland v. Union Ins. Co., 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 308, 321-22 (1811).
19 ADOLPH BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1
(rev. ed. 1948) ("[T]here may be said to have evolved a 'corporate system' as there was once a
feudal system .... ).
20 Under principles of corporate law, officers and directors have two basic fiduciary duties: the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires that a director or officer discharge
his or her duties in good faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent person in like position would
exercise, and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corpora-
tion. Great Rivers Co-Op. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 1999);
Rehab. Advisors, Inc. v. Floyd, 601 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). The duty of loyalty
requires that directors and officers remain loyal to the corporation, acting at all times in the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, whose interests must take precedence over any
self-interest of the director, officer, or controlling shareholder that is not shared by the stockhold-
ers generally. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
21 Generally speaking, directors and officers of corporations face two types of claimants: (1)
disgruntled shareholders who sue on behalf of the corporation in a derivative action or in their
own right, and (2) third parties such as creditors, employees, vendors, customers, or government
agencies. Roberta Romano. What Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance?,
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1. 3 (1989).
2010]
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ficers' liability insurance became a fixture in the modern corporate environ-
ment. 22  "Plaintiffs who sue directors and officers typically seek large judg-
ments, potentially resulting in substantial losses to both the corporation as well
as individual officers and directors. 2 3 This risk of liability prompted state leg-
islatures to authorize corporations to purchase D&O policies that indemnify the
corporation and its directors against liability exposures.24  Most D&O policies
provide coverage for exposure corresponding to claims first made during the
policy period.25 In addition, the vast majority of D&O policies commit the in-
surer to absorbing the costs of mounting legal defense against the claims.26
Risks of liability are thereby transferred to the insurer in exchange for the in-
27
sured's premium payments.
One problem that hinders the ability of D&O insurers to spread risk
arises in the form of a "moral hazard. ' , 28 In a general sense, the term is used to
describe the perverse effect that insurance may have on the probability that cov-
29
ered losses will occur. If an insured's risk is completely eliminated through
transfer to an insurer, then the insured might have less incentive to take meas-
ures that prevent the loss from occurring.30 In the D&O context, moral hazard is
used to describe the theoretical tendency for insurance to reduce the incentives
for corporate directors and officers to protect against loss or to minimize the
cost of loss. 3' For example, a director or officer might be tempted to make hasty
22 Sousa, supra note 10, at 366 ("[P]resently, as many as ninety-five percent of Fortune 500
companies maintain directors and officers liability insurance.").
23 Melanie K. Palmore, "Insured vs. Insured" Exclusions in Director and Officer Liability
Insurance Policies: Is Coverage Available When Chapter II Trustees and Debtors- in-Possession
Sue Former Directors and Officers?, 9 BKR. DEV. J. 101, 103 (1992).
24 Id.
25 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE DESKBOOK 3 (David E. Bordon et al. eds.,
American Bar Association 1998). Liability insurance policies come in one of two forms: "occur-
rence" and "claims-made." Most liability policies are occurrence-based, but claims-made policies
are the norm in professional malpractice insurance. Claims-made policies provide coverage only
if the act of neglect is discovered and brought to the insurer's attention during the policy term.
regardless of when the act occurred. Thus, the insured event is the filing of the claim, and cover-
age will extend to events that occurred even before the policy became effective. Id. at 5.
26 Id. at 93. Most D&O policies now provide for advancement of defense costs by the insurer
upon request by an insured. Typically, a D&O policy is a "wasting policy" because defense costs
effectively reduce the policy limits.
27 Id. at3.
28 BAKER, supra note 14, at 4.
29 Id.
3o JERRY, supra note 2, at 17. "For example, if a mechanic knows that in the event his tools
are stolen the insurer will reimburse the loss in full, [he] may be less likely to suffer the inconve-
nience of putting tools in a locked storage area at the end of each working day." Id.: see also
Biltmore Assoc., L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[A]lmost
nobody intentionally indices someone else to collide with his car, but some might have an interest
in burning down his own house if he owed more on it than it was worth.").
I See BAIKER. supra note 14, at 4.
[Vol. 112
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decisions in selling corporate assets because he or she is secure in the know-
ledge that the insurance company will pay for any losses resulting from a legal
challenge to that decision. Economists characterize this as ex ante moral ha-
zard.32 The inclusion of a 'duty to defend' clause may exacerbate the problem
on an ex post basis, when the director or officer (and, by extension, the corpora-
tion) does not care very much about the expense of defending against the claim,
as long as the insurance company honors its promise to recompense the in-
sured.33
In D&O insurance, moral hazard takes two additional forms. First, be-
cause of the unique identity between the entity corporation and its own directors
and officers, a temptation arises for parties who are insured under D&O policies
to collude.3 4 In so doing, the insureds "would in essence 'force' its insurer to
pay for the poor business decisions of its officers and directors by the corpora-
tion filing an action against its own officers and directors. '35 If those 'sacrificial
lambs' are held liable, they may seek to avoid using personal funds to satisfy the
judgment by claiming the amount of damages against the corporate D&O insur-
ance policy.
36
A second layer of moral hazard emerges where the corporation is care-
less in appointing competent officials because it expects to be compensated for
damages resulting from bad decisions. In the zone of insolvency, such mis-
judgments might include the hasty sale of corporate assets to the detriment of
the corporation, its creditors, and ultimately, the D&O insurer. Under Bridge-
port Holdings, such actions or inactions may lead to liability and subsequent
invocation of provisions in a D&O policy by both parties to the contract.
In an effort to address the moral hazards to which D&O policies give
rise, and to prevent D&O liability insurance from functioning as business-loss
insurance, insurers design contracts so as to exclude collusive claims from cov-
erage. 37 Commonly appearing in D&O policies is the so-called "insured vs.
32 Id.
33 See id.
34 See, e.g., Lawton v. Nyman, 62 F. Supp. 2d 533 (D. R.I. 1999) (directors and officers speak
on behalf of the corporation and may be held vicariously liable for its acts).
3 Sousa, supra note 10, at 370.
36 Matter of Liquidation of WAfBIC Indem. Corp., 499 N.W.2d 257, 260 (Wis. App. 1993)
(construing an insurer's duties to the insured under corporate D&O policies).
37 See Palmore, supra note 23, at 103-04 ("The exclusion was designed to prevent collusion
among the corporation and its directors and officers. In effect, allowing a corporation to recover
its losses by simply suing its own executives ...."); see also Level 3 Communications, 168 F.3d
at 958 (The purpose underlying the exclusion is to prevent collusion, "such as suits in which a
corporation sues its officers and directors in an effort to recoup the consequences of their business
mistakes ... thus turning liability insurance into business-loss insurance .... ). Biltmore Assoc..
L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663. 669 (2009) ("Because risks such as collusion and
moral hazard are much greater for claims by one insured against another insured on the same
policy than for claims by strangers, liability policies typically exclude them from coverage. Al-
lowing such claims would turn liability insurance into casualty insurance, because the company
2010]
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insured" exclusion, which "bars coverage for claims made by one insured under
the policy ... against another insured under the same policy., 38 Through the
"insured vs. insured" exclusion, insurers endeavor to minimize moral hazards
that inhere in the business of insuring corporate directors and the entities for
whom they speak against potential breaches of fiduciary duty. 39
The public also has an interest in ensuring that "insured vs. insured" ex-
clusions are properly applied. Because collusion in connection with a corporate
bankruptcy is civilly punishable through punitive damages and can rise to the
level of criminal behavior, the public's interest in punishing and deterring such
behavior is only served when the wrongdoers - and not their insurers - are
required to account for their deeds. Liability for such misconduct is established
in section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, which delivers a clear mandate against
the use of collusive practices in the sale of assets of a bankruptcy estate.40
While section 363 provides explicitly for punitive damages, it does not specifi-
cally mention criminal liability for collusion.41 However, criminal prosecution
may be authorized by other parts of the United States Code. As Binford ex-
plains:
Title 18 ... lists at least two circumstances under which a col-
luding party could be prosecuted criminally. Under section 152,
in a bankruptcy case, a party may be held criminally liable for
knowingly and fraudulently making a false oath or filing a false
statement under penalty of perjury. Liability could arise, there-
fore, if a party falsely denies engaging in collusive behavior
when questioned by the court at a [section] 363 hearing to ap-
prove the sale of assets. Moreover, section 152 provides that
parties can be held criminally liable for knowingly and fraudu-
would be able to collect from the insurance company for its own mistakes, since it acts through its
directors and officers.").
38 Sousa, supra note 10, at 368.
9 See id.
40 11 U.S.C. § 363(n) provides that: "[t]he Trustee may avoid a sale under this section if the
sale price was controlled by an agreement among potential bidders at such sale. or may recover
from a party to such agreement any amount by which the value of the property sold exceeds the
price at which such sale was consummated, and may recover any costs, attorneys' fees, or ex-
penses incurred in avoiding such sale or recovering such amount. In addition to any recovery
under the preceding sentence, the court may grant judgment for punitive damages in favor of the
estate and against any such party that entered into such an agreement in willful disregard of this
subsection." As was true in Bridgeport Holdings, directors and officers who breach fiduciary
duties in bankruptcy often do so in connection with the disposition of assets under Code section
363. For other examples. see In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1991): In re Performance
Nutrition, Inc.. 239 B.R. 93, 42 Collier Bankr. Cas.2d (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999) (debtor-in-
possession breached fiduciary duties by failing to appropriately market the debtor's business, and
by failing to disclose his interest in the sale of the business' assets as a shareholding officer of the
same).
41 11 U.S.C § 363(n).
[Vol. 112
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lently receiving property "with intent to defeat the provisions of
[the Bankruptcy Code]." 42
This admonition finds support from section 157, which prohibits "bank-
ruptcy fraud," among other false and fraudulent schemes.4 3 Since collusion in
the sale of assets in a bankruptcy estate may be tantamount to common-law
44fraud, the participants therein may "knowingly and fraudulently receive prop-
erty" in defiance of the Bankruptcy Code - an act that is criminally punishable
under Title 18 of the United States Code.
Because Titles 11 and 18 of the United States Code elevate collusion in
connection with bankruptcy sales to a level of conduct to which punitive dam-
ages and criminal liability may attach, courts must interpret "insured vs. in-
sured" exclusions to ensure that collusive behavior is not covered under policies
of D&O insurance. The public policy at play in this context is the same that
motivates the inclusion of "punitive damages" and "criminal acts" exclusions in
other types of insurance policies. 45 Frequently, insurers refuse indemnification
of punitive damages and criminal penalties because these fees are imposed to
punish the wrongdoer for his actions and to deter similar conduct from occur-
ring in the future.46 These purposes are seriously undermined if the wrongdoer
42 Jason Binford, Collusion Confusion: Where Do Courts Draw the Lines in Applying Bank-
ruptcy Code Section 363(n)?, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 41, 70 (2008).
43 18 U.S.C. § 157 (listing actions constituting bankruptcy fraud).
44 Stephen R. Schmidt, The Bad Faith Setup, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 705, 727-28. Schmidt ex-
plains that "[c]ollusion and fraud ... are not necessarily tantamount to the common-law tort of
fraud in that there need not be a misrepresentation of a material fact. Any negotiated settlement
involves cooperation to a degree. It becomes collusive when the purpose is to injure the interest of
an absent or nonparticipating, such as an insurer or nonsettling defendant. Among the indicators
of bad faith and collusion are unreasonableness, misrepresentation. concealment, secretiveness,
lack of serious negotiations on damages, attempts to affect the insurance coverage, profit to the
insured, and attempts to harm the interests of the insurer. They have in common unfairness to the
insurer, which is probably the bottom line in cases in which collusion is found." Id. (emphasis
added).
45 Vargas v. Calabrese, 714 F. Supp. 714, 725 (D. N.J. 1989) ("First. an insurer's coverage of
intentional acts is violative of public policy unless the breadth of coverage is limited by exclusion
of criminal acts .... Second, coverage or defense of punitive damages is always against public
policy."); Peterson v. Superior Ct, 31 Cal. 3d. 147, 158 (Cal. 1982).
46 Although punishment is the most often cited reason for assessing punitive and criminal
damages. courts also respect the deterrent objectives of these fees. When an insurer must bear the
cost of a wrongdoer's penalty, the goal of deterrence is similarly undermined. Putative wrong-
doers will not be deterred by the threat of being punished if they are permitted to shift that pu-
nishment to the innocent insurer. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 678, 693
(N.D. Tex. 1996) ("given the punitive and deterrent components of punitive damages, public
policy considerations . . . should override an analysis of contract language"); see also S. Loyd
Neal, Comment. Punitive Damages. Suggested Reform for an Insurance Problem, 18 ST. MARY'S
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is permitted to transfer his penalty to the innocent insurer through a contract of
insurance.47
The principle applies with equal force in the context of collusion in
bankruptcy proceedings. "Insured vs. insured" exclusions must be interpreted
by courts in a way that prevents wrongdoers from shifting punishment for their
nefarious acts onto innocent insurance providers. 48 By making informed, rea-
soned, and appropriate determinations as to the applicability of such exclusions,
courts will preserve public's interest punishment and deterrence, and properly
admonish against the practice of collusion where bankruptcy and insurance in-
tersect.
PART II. INREBR1DGEPORTHLD1NGS, INC. AND THE AMPLIFIED POTENTIAL
FOR D&O LIABILITY IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY CASES
Before 1985, liability was rarely imposed upon corporate directors and
officers for bad judgment or unsuccessful business decisions due to the protec-
tion offered by the "business judgment rule., 49 The rule embodies three no-
tions: that shareholders voluntarily undertake the risk of bad judgment on the
part of corporate leadership, that post hoc litigation is an imperfect vehicle by
which to evaluate corporate business decisions, and that corporate leaders
should not be overly dissuaded from undertaking risks, as risks often lead to
profit. 50 In its strongest form, the business judgment rule operated to insulate
corporate directors and officers from liability so long as they had not breached
their duty of loyalty to the corporation through fraud, self-dealing, or bad faith.51
Most observers acknowledge that the increased rise in litigation against
corporations and their directors and officers is attributable to the weakening of
the business judgment rule, effectuated by the Supreme Court of Delaware 52 in
Smith v. VanGorkom.53  That case involved a shareholder class action suit
47 See Neal, supra note 46.
48 Economic externalities may also result from judicial misinterpretation of insurance policies.
If courts demand that insurers provide coverage for events that were intended to be excluded, the
result is unexpected costs inuring to the insurer. These costs will be passed on to consumers of
insurance in the form of heightened premiums. Said another way. if an exclusion is not effective
to bar unintended coverage, then prices will respond to account for the broader coverage actually
provided.
49 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880. 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
50 Id. at 885-86.
51 Id.
52 Delaware is widely regarded as the nation's most influential jurisdiction in the development
and interpretation of principles in corporate law. In their treatise on derivative actions, Donald
Wolfe and Michael Pittinger described the Delaware Chancery Court as "the nation's most in-
fluential corporate tribunal." Donald J. Wolfe, Jr & Michael A. Pittenger, Distinguishing Deriva-
tive Claims from Direct Claims Under Delaware Law, 1486 P.L.I. CORP. 1293, 1293 (2005).
53 Smith v. VanGorkom, 488 A.2d 853, 863 (Del. 1985) accord Sousa, supra note 10. at 373.
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against the board of directors of Trans Union Corporation. 54 The plaintiffs al-
leged that members of the board breached their fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion by approving a cash-out merger between Trans Union and New T Compa-
ny, a wholly owned subsidiary of Marmon Group, Inc., without informing them-
selves about the details of the transaction.
55
Reversing the decision of the appellate court below, the Delaware Su-
preme Court refused to insulate the directors from liability arising from "their
failure to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them and
relevant to their decision to recommend the . . . merger" and their "failure to
disclose all material information such as a reasonable stockholder would con-
sider important in deciding whether to approve the . . . offer. 56 Thus, even in
the absence of fraud, self-dealing, or bad faith on the part of the directors, the
board's business judgment was not afforded the type of deference that had been
routinely offered by courts in prior precedent.5  Commentators note that the
VanGorkon decision "highlighted the risk of director liability for failing to
make an informed business judgment and caused insurance companies to be-
come "skittish" about issuing liability insurance coverage for a corporation's
directors and officers. 5 8
Similarly, the recent decision in In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc. high-
lights the potential for director and officer liability incurring as a result of failure
to make a considered business decision in the context of a corporate bankrupt-
cy.59 In Bridgeport Holdings, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of Delaware denied a motion to dismiss certain breach of fiduciary duty
claims asserted by the Bridgeport Holdings, Inc. Liquidating Trust against the
former directors and officers of Bridgeport Holdings, Inc. 60 The Trust alleged
that the D&O defendants failed to consider potential alternatives to the sale of
54 VanGorkom, 488 A.2d at 863.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 893. The court found that the board of directors failed to adequately inform them-
selves as to [the CEO's] role in forcing the sale of Trans Union and in selecting the per se share
price. In addition, the board remained uninformed as to the intrinsic value of Trans Union. Ac-
cording to the court, these acts constituted gross negligence on the part of the board where its
approval was given upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency
of a crisis or emergency. Id. at 874.
57 For a thorough discussion of the rationale behind judicial deference to business decisions,
see Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and Organiza-
tion: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L.REv. 179, 181-82 (2001); Eric W.
Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.REv. 1565, 1588
(1993): Ralph K. Winter, On 'Protecting the Ordinary Investor,' 63 WASH. L.REv. 881, 895
(1988): Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit
in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L.REv. 261, 270 71
(1986).
58 Sousa, supra note 10, at 374.
59 In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc., 388 B.R. 548 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
60 Id. at 559.
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the company, abdicated their decision-making authority to a restructuring advi-
sor, and acquiesced to the advisor's decision to sell corporate assets on the eve
of bankruptcy instead of proceeding to court-supervised sale under section 363
of the Bankruptcy Code.61
Like in VanGorkom, the court in Bridgeport Holdings found the actions
taken by the director and officer defendants gave rise to a claim for the breach
of fiduciary duty even in the absence of self-dealing or fraud.62  The board's
failure to make affirmative, deliberate, and informed decisions prior to bank-
ruptcy was, in the Bridgeport Holdings court's view, a sufficient basis upon
which to deny the directors and officers the protection of the business judgment
rule.63 Bridgeport Holdings extends the rule in VanGorkon to the bankruptcy
context. For the leaders of businesses on the brink of financial failure, Bridge-
port Holdings should signal that the zone of insolvency is a "no wake" area in
which abundant measures of caution must be observed.
PART III. BANKRUPTCY CONSTITUENTS, COLLUSION, AND THE "INSURED VS.
INSURED" EXCLUSION IN CORPORATE D&O POLICIES
Without question, a corporate bankruptcy has always been "an event
that is likely to precipitate lawsuits against the corporation's directors and offic-
ers in their individual capacities as all interested parties scramble to find ave-
nues to augment the bankruptcy estate. '6 4 After Bridgeport Holdings, however,
the risk that lawsuits will be filed in the zone of insolvency is amplified. Ac-
cording to that case, a failure to act or to exercise careful discretion in delegat-
ing responsibilities prior to filing for bankruptcy protection may lead to liabili-
ty. Thus, where economic conditions threaten the financial health of corpora-
tions, cautious directors and officers will demand the shelter of a D&O policy. 66
61 Id. at 555. The Liquidating Trust asserted that the D&O Defendants breached their duty of
loyalty on the grounds that the board (a) did not attempt to sell the assets of the company before a
liquidity crisis ensued: (b) waited too long to hire a restructuring advisor despite the request to do
so by the company's secured lenders (c) abdicated its decision-making authority to the COO: and
(d) acquiesced to the COO's decision to sell the assets of the company on the eve of bankruptcy.
No formal sale process was undertaken by the COO or the Defendants, and the COO did not seek
competing bids despite the existence of a potential market for the assets. The D&O defendants
approved the sale of substantially all assets of the company for $28 million - a fraction of the
$126 million present value of the company's operations. Id. at 553.
62 Id. at 555.
63 ld.
64 Sousa, supra note 10, at 369 (citing Nan Roberts Eitel, ANow You Have It, ANow You Don't:
Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance After a Corporate Bankruptcy. 46 Loy. L. REv. 585
(2000)).
65 In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc., 388 B.R. 548 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
66 Jonathan C. Dickey & John D. van Loben Sels. Indemnification and Insurance for Directors
and Officers of Public Companies: What Directors and Officers Need to Know in the Post-
Sarbanes-Oxley World, Stanford Directors College (June 2-3, 2003) (discussing generally how
economic trends affect D&O insurance, and specifically how the "insured vs. insured" exclusion
[Vol. 112
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Assuming that insurers are able to predict, based on economic factors,
that the incidence of corporate bankruptcies will rise, such organizations will
have reason to grow even more "skittish" about issuing D&O liability policies.
Premium prices will rise in response, causing insureds to accept stronger exclu-
sions to control increases in the cost of policies. 67 In a bankruptcy proceeding,
perhaps the most directly implicated exclusion is the "insured vs. insured" ex-
clusion, which denies coverage for liability generated when one "insured" sues
another "insured. 6 8
The special relevance of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion in bank-
ruptcy results from the procedural mandates of the Bankruptcy Code. The filing
of every bankruptcy case results in the creation of an estate which is comprised
of the property owned by the debtor when the case began. 69 The estate is a sep-
arate legal entity that is overseen throughout the proceeding by one or more
bankruptcy constituents, who "step into the shoes" of the pre-petition entity.
"Simply stated, the bankruptcy estate takes whatever interest a debtor has in
property as of the petition date, subject to the same limitations and restrictions
on the use of property that existed pre-petition. 70  Under Code section 541, the
original debtor's interest in any cause of action that has accrued prior to the fil-
ing of the petition is property of the estate.71 It follows in fact and logic that the
estate is subject to the same insurance coverage limitations and defenses to cov-
72
erage to which the debtor was bound pre-petition. Since the estate brings
claims against corporate directors and officers through its administrating consti-
tuent, insurers who have included an "insured vs. insured" provision in a D&O
is featured in bankruptcy environments); ("[a]long with the market turmoil of the last two years,
public companies have experienced one of the toughest -if not the toughest -periods of retren-
chment and contraction in the D&O insurance marketplace in recent memory").
67 See, e.g., Criger v. Becton, 902 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1990) (broadened flood insurance pro-
gram resulted in higher premiums paid by insureds); John Beaudette, Inc., v. Sentry Ins. a Mut.
Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Mass. 1999) (premium decreased due to the inclusion of a less restric-
tive pollution exclusion).
68 This point is intuitive, as corporate directors and officers are often assigned culpability for
contributing to the financial decline of the organizations they serve. Once a corporation files for
bankruptcy protection, the estate may choose to sue directors and officers in an effort to recoup
the losses for which such individuals may be responsible.
69 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000). In reorganization cases, the debtor's estate also includes proper-
ty acquired by the debtor after the case has begun.
70 Sousa, supra note 10, at 415.
71 United States v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Most impor-
tantly, the property of the bankruptcy estate includes all causes of action that the debtor could
have brought at the time of the bankruptcy petition.").
72 Under 11 U.S.C. § 365, executory contracts and unexpired leases may be avoided by the
court post-petition. However, since an insurance policy is not executory during the coverage
term, such contracts are not subject to modification by the bankruptcy court. Thus, if the debtor
had rights of indemnification pre-petition, as assets of the bankruptcy estate they are subject to the
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policy attempt to characterize those parties as "insureds" so as to render the ex-
73
clusion applicable to bar coverage.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was the first
federal appellate court to rule on the issue of whether the "insured vs. insured"
exclusion will bar recovery when claims against directors and officers are as-
serted on behalf of a bankruptcy estate. In Reliance Insurance Co. of Ill. v.
Weis, the court affirmed a lower court ruling that there is "no significant legal
distinction between [the original debtor] and its bankruptcy estate" for the pur-
poses of determining whether an "insured vs. insured" exclusion applies.74 In
Weis, the insurer issued a D&O policy to Band Building and Equipment Com-
pany ("BBC"). 75  BBC filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 and
created a trust to implement BBC's asset liquidation plan.76
Trust administrators in Weis filed an action against the former directors
and officers of BBC, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and asserting that the
corporation had been managed negligently.77 The insurer denied coverage and
filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to confirm that the "insured
vs. insured" exclusion barred the suit brought on behalf of the estate against
BBC's former directors and officers. 78 The court held that recovery was barred
under the "insured vs. insured" exclusion because the action was brought "on
behalf of' the corporation and its bankruptcy estate, even though the "benefits
sought might eventually inure to creditors. 79
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the court's decision in Weis when it
decided National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Olympia Holding
Corp.80 There, the court concluded that there is no legal distinction between a
pre-petition debtor and a chapter 7 liquidating trustee for the purposes of inter-
preting the "insured vs. insured" exclusion in a D&O liability policy."' The
National Union court echoed Weis in explaining that, because the bankruptcy
73 In re County Seat Stores, 280 B.R. 319, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
74 148 B.R. 575 (E.D. Mo. 1992), aff'd, 5 F.3d 532 (8th Cir. 1993). Like many courts charged
with the interpretation of insurance policy contracts, the court in Weis neglected to undertake a
close reading and analysis of the contractual language included in the policy itself. The court did
cite the exclusion in question and represented the same within the text of its opinion. Id. at 578.
However, in construing the meaning of the exclusion, the court seems only to consider the inter-
pretations offered by the two adverse parties without affording sufficient attention to the words
contained in the policy. See id.
75 Id. at 577.
76 Id. at 577-78.
77 Id. at 578. The trust sought $50 million in damages against the former directors and officers
of BBC. Id.
78 Id. at 580.
79 Id. at 583.
80 No. 1:94-cv-2081-GET (N.D. Ga. Sept. 18, 1995), aff'd without opinion, 148 F.3d 1070
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trustee "stands in the shoes of the debtor corporation in prosecuting a cause of
action belonging to the debtor," the trustee is properly considered an "insured"
82
within the meaning of the exclusion. Recovery under the policy was accor-
dingly denied.83
While the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits may seem to have achieved
consensus in their application of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion in the bank-
ruptcy context, case law arriving at contrary conclusions has since developed in
many lower courts. For example, in In re County Seat Stores, the court found
that "the language of the 'insured vs. insured' exclusion ... does not include or
contemplate a bankruptcy trustee.,,8 4 In that case, a court-appointed Chapter 11
trustee brought an action against the former officers and directors of County
Seat Stores, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duties.8 5 The purpose of the trustee's
action "was to benefit the bankruptcy estate with the intent of having the poten-
tial proceeds distributed to . . . creditors pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code." 86
The court reasoned that the "insured vs. insured" exclusion is designed to pre-
vent collusive lawsuits, and that "[t]he trustee, as a truly adverse party, does not,
or should not, raise concerns of collusion because the trustee does not represent
the interests of any party that could be a participant of a conspiracy to col-
lude. 8 7 Thus, the insurer was required to remit payment pursuant to the D&O
policy it had entered with County Seat Stores. 88
One explanation for this decisional divergence may involve the metho-
dology - or lack thereof- currently employed by courts in considering the
applicability of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion in bankruptcy cases. 89 Of-
ten, courts will focus on one or some of various possible factors, attributing va-
rying degrees of weight to each in analyzing facts presented. 90 One product of
this unguided analytical technique is an apparent disagreement among courts as
to the effect of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion in bankruptcy. Another re-
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 In re County Seat Stores, 280 B.R. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
85 Id. at 328.
86 Id. at 329.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Sousa, supra note 10.
90 Eric C. Peterson, D&O Coverage for Bankruptcy Litigation: Does the 'Insured vs. Insured'
Exception Leave Executives Exposed?, 4 No. 6 ANDREWS BANKR. LITIG. REP. 2 (July 2007) (dis-
cussing the "various factors" coming into play when courts analyze the applicability of the "in-
sured vs. insured" exclusion: whether the plaintiff is a third-party trustee or debtor-in-possession;
whether the claims were first made by the company and were later inherited by a court-appointed
trustee; whether the claims are raised by a non-statutory assignee; the importance of the anti-
collusion policy behind the exception; and whether the policy is ambiguous such that the doctrine
of contra proferentum would militate interpretation in favor of the insured).
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sult is the emergence of inappropriate bright-line rules when decisions interpret-
ing the exclusion are compared.
For instance, a comparison of In re Molten Metal Technology, Inc,
91
and In re R.J. Reynolds92 may lead a court to draw an overly rigid bright-line
distinction on the question of whether a bankruptcy constituent was voluntarily
appointed. In Molten Metal, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachu-
setts held that a court-appointed Chapter 11 trustee was not the legal equivalent
of the original debtor. 93 In defense of their decision to deny coverage based on
the "insured vs. insured" exclusion, the company's D&O insurers argued that
the debtor's active negotiation of the terms of the contract was evidence that the
debtor understood and agreed to be bound by those terms. 94 In addition, the
insurers relied on an opinion by the debtor's outside counsel stating that cover-
age would likely be barred under the exclusion by virtue of the trustee's identity
with the debtor. 95 Finally, the insurers pointed to a representation made by the
trustee during a preliminary hearing, in which the trustee acknowledged that he
"stands in [the debtor's] shoes in nearly every respect. 96 The court disagreed
with the insurer's conclusions, holding that D&O coverage was not barred by
the "insured vs. insured" exclusion because the trustee was not the legal equiva-
lent of the pre-petition debtor.
97
In dicta, the Molten Metal court instructed that "the insurers would es-
tablish the legal equivalence of the trustee and the original debtor by pointing to
three factors: that a Chapter 11 trustee exercises the same rights and powers as
would a debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11 and therefore is virtually inter-
changeable with the debtor; that the trustee is prosecuting the Company's causes
of action; and that, in prosecuting those causes of action, he "stands in the Com-
pany's shoes" and is subject to such defenses [that] could have [been] asserted
against the Debtor [had the action been brought pre-petition]." 98 Further, the
91 Id. (citing In re Molten Metal Technologies, Inc., 271 B.R. 711 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002)).
92 315 B.R. at 674.
93 Molten Metal, 271 B.R. at 729.
94 Id. at 722.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 721.
97 Id. at 732.
98 Id. at 729. The court concluded that the insurers failed to satisfy this standard because
"[w]ith respect to each factor, the insurers either misstate the law or gloss over significant fea-
tures." Id. Specifically, the insurers failed to demonstrate that, although the trustee could exercise
the same rights as a debtor-in-possession, the trustee enjoyed the same equivalence with the com-
pany generally. In addition, the insurers failed to show that the trustee was prosecuting causes of
action on the debtor's behalf, even though they did establish that the claims being prosecuted did
arise in favor of the debtor. Finally, the court found that,
while it is certainly true that a trustee "stands in the shoes of a debtor" when
prosecuting causes of action that arose in favor of the debtor before the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy case, it is also true that this doctrine does not
mean that the trustee is the debtor. It only means that the trustee, despite his or
[Vol. 112
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court explained that, as a matter of Massachusetts law, insurance contracts were
to be construed against the carrier where ambiguities arose, and that no express
reference to [bankruptcy constituents or other parties] was "indication that no
broader exclusion was intended." 99
Considering a similar pattern of facts but employing very different ra-
tionales, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia reached a
conclusion in direct disagreement with the court in Molten Metal. In In re R.J.
Reynolds, the court addressed the question of whether claims brought against
corporate officers by a Chapter 11 trustee triggered the "insured vs. insured"
exclusion in its D&O policy.100 The court characterized the language of the
provision as follows:
The Policy excludes claims which are "brought or maintained
by or on behalf of any Insured." This exception includes any
claims that are brought or maintained by or on behalf of the
Debtor. There is an exception to this exception. The exception
does not apply to "a claim that is derivative action brought or
maintained on behalf of [the Debtor] by one or more persons
who are not Insured persons, and who bring or maintain the
Claim without the solicitation, assistance or participation of [the
Debtor] .... 101
The insurers argued that because the trustee brought the claims "by or
on behalf of an insured," recovery was barred by the exclusion. 10 2 The court
agreed with the insurers, but maintained that the mere fact that the trustee steps
into the shoes of the debtor with regard to the claims against the directors and
officers does not necessarily trigger the "insured vs. insured" exclusion. 103
According to the court in RJ Reynolds, "the determining factor is that
the Trustee steps into the shoes of the Debtor by virtue of a voluntary affirma-
tive act of the Debtor, not by [an] involuntary appointment [by the court]. 10 4
Indeed, the court expressed that the voluntary nature of the trustee's appoint-
ment was the "critical distinction" between the facts of that case and those pre-
sented in Molten Metal. 10 5 In explaining the emphasis it placed on this particu-
her nonidentity with the debtor, is nonetheless subject to such defenses as the
defendant has against the debtor.
Id. at 729-30. For these reasons, the court reached the "inescapable conclusion" that the trustee
and the company were distinct entities without legal equivalence. Id. at 730.
99 Molten Metal, 271 B.R. at 725.
100 In re R.J. Reynolds, 315 B.R. 674, 674 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2003).
101 Id. at 677.
102 Id. at 675.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 678.
105 Id. at 679.
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lar factor, the RJ Reynolds court recounted the policy concerns that give rise to
the inclusion of an "insured vs. insured" clause in a D&O indemnity contract:
A primary reason that insurers require [such] clauses be in-
cluded in D&O policies is to avoid the possibility of collusion
between the corporation and the directors and officers. In Mol-
ten Metal the Court reasoned that it need not place any reliance
on the purpose of the exclusion because chapter I I trustees
have no incentive to collude with directors and officers. In a
case in which the debtor voluntarily transfers the causes of ac-
tion to a third party, there is the distinct possibility of collusion
between the debtor and the directors and officers. Furthermore,
the debtor may have an incentive to assign its claims against the
directors and officers, without colluding with them, in order to
obtain a larger concession from the creditors. This is especially
true when the plan is a plan of reorganization and the debtor
contemplates continuing his operations. 106
Observing that the debtor "solicited the action against [the directors and
officers] by creating the trustee," the court found that the trustee brought the
action "only with the solicitation, assistance, or participation of the debtor."
°10 7
Since such activity was expressly excluded from coverage under the exception
to the exception appearing in the debtor's policy, the court absolved the insurer
of its duty to indemnify the officers for liability on the claims. 10 8
Molten Metal and R.J. Reynolds demonstrate that, absent clear guidance
as to how the "insured vs. insured" exclusion should be applied in bankruptcy
cases, inappropriate bright-line rules may emerge in jurisprudence. In Molten
Metal, the court focused on the legal inequivalence between the original, pre-
petition debtor and the involuntarily created bankruptcy constituent to whom the
estate was entrusted.10 9 In R.J. Reynolds, the court found that the voluntary na-
ture of the trustee's appointment engendered the threat of collusion since it was
effectuated with the "solicitation, assistance, or participation" of the debtor. '10
Clearly, the distinguishing line between these cases is drawn on the question of
The critical distinction between Molten Metal and the case at bar is that the
Trustee in this case obtained standing by virtue of the Debtor's voluntary as-
signment. through the Plan, of claims against the directors and officers and not
by the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee, an act that is almost always ef-
fected in contravention of the wishes of a debtor.
Id.
106 In re R.J. Reynolds, 315 B.R. 674, 680-81 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2003).
107 Id. at 682.
108 Id.
109 In re Molten Metal Technologies, Inc., 271 B.R. 711, 711 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
110 R.J Reynolds, 315 B.R. at 682.
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whether the bankruptcy constituent was appointed voluntarily. When read in
tandem, Molten Metal and R.J. Reynolds establish an improper bright-line rule:
the "insured vs. insured" exclusion cannot apply in a case of voluntary appoint-
ment. Although a bright-line rule may be attractive for its ability to foster pre-
dictability and avoid litigation, such a rule would yield inappropriate results
when applied to many cases.' Because of the complexity of corporate bank-
ruptcy proceedings and the variation in contractual language at play in each, a
simplistic test should not guide a court's analysis of an "insured vs. insured"
exclusion in the context of business insolvencies.
To avoid the misguidance of overly rigid, bright-line rules that have
emerged in case law thus far, courts are in need of a more comprehensive diag-
nostic tool. This need has not gone unnoticed by scholars, some of whom have
proposed solutions of their own. In 1997, Professor Michael Sousa proposed a
four-factor test for applying the "insured vs. insured" exclusion in bankrupt-
cy. He asks courts to consider "1) whether 'true adversity' exists between
litigating parties; 2) the status of the plaintiff at the time the claim is made; 3)
the identity of the beneficiaries of the claim ... and 4) the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties."11 3 Sousa goes on to apply each of these factors to different
bankruptcy constituents, arriving at predictive conclusions about the applicabili-
ty of the exclusion to each one.'1
Although it follows a thorough and insightful treatment of the issue's
history in the courts, Sousa's proposed solution fails for two reasons. First,
Sousa has identified from case law a group of considerations that have emerged
as most instructive.'" His multi-factor test, however, leaves courts in the same
problematic position in which he found them: faced with a multiplicity of fac-
tors to consider without clear guidance as to how to consider them in assessing
unfamiliar actors in bankruptcy. Even more precarious are the conclusions he
draws about the bankruptcy constituents examined. Taken at their face, these
predictions form the same type of inappropriate bright-line rules that Sousa him-
self condemns." 6 Contrary to Sousa's conclusions, bankruptcy constituents and
H One such case would involve a voluntary appointment that was effectuated without the
"solicitation, assistance or participation" of the debtor. See In re R.J. Reynolds, 315 B.R. 674,
682 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2003). Such an appointment could arise by the voluntary action of a credi-
tor's committee, corporate shareholders, or other party with significant non-identity to the original
debtor.
112 Sousa, supra note 10 at 371.
113 Id. at 365.
114 Id. at 404. Sousa applies his multi-factor test to the following bankruptcy constituents: the
debtor-in-possession, the Chief Restructuring Officer, the plan trustee, the bankruptcy trustee, and
the creditors' committee.
115 Id.
116 Sousa, supra note 10, at 404 ("A completely overriding, definitive rule ... under an 'in-
sured vs. insured' provision would prove unworkable when applied to the bankruptcy context.
given the dynamics of the bankruptcy process and the differing ways in which an 'insured vs.
insured' exclusion might arise in litigation.").
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their activities should not be evaluated prospectively for the purposes of every
future case. Rather, each should be examined on a case-by-case basis according
to an organized analysis that is easy for courts to apply.
Second, Sousa's fourth factor (reasonable expectations of the parties)
fails to recognize that the ex ante expectations of parties who do not anticipate
bankruptcy, and who are unaware of its unique interplay with insurance law,
may not be reasonable at all. Thus, the analysis he suggests imposes an artifi-
cial standard of reasonableness upon expectations that may have been formed in
the absence of adequate information. That the insured corporation is likely "a
sophisticated commercial entity with better than adequate legal representation"
does not mean that its expectations of what will occur in bankruptcy are realis-
tic. 7 "Insured vs. insured" exclusions are included in D&O policies in con-
templation of shareholder derivative suits, not bankruptcy proceedings." 8 Ex-
pectations of what the exclusion will produce in bankruptcy cannot be formed
with any degree of reasonability if bankruptcy itself is an unexpected event. 1 9
Problems arising from "insured vs. insured" exclusions in bankruptcy
require systematic analysis that is informed by the intersecting bodies of insol-
vency and insurance law. Taking guidance from relevant jurisprudence that has
emerged, the next section of this Article suggests such a system of analysis, and
intends to lead courts to correct results through two straightforward steps.
PART IV. A Two-STEP INQUIRY TO ACHIEVE PREDICTABLE RESULTS
Because the issue exists at the nexus of insurance law and bankruptcy
law, courts cannot properly apply "insured vs. insured" exclusions in the insol-
vency context without harmonizing the substantive principles of both bodies of
law. 20 Simultaneously, courts must adhere to their duty to "ascertain the intent
of the parties as manifested in the language of the agreement."' 2' Given the
dynamics of the bankruptcy process and the myriad ways in which in "insured
vs. insured" exclusion might arise in insolvency litigation, an analytical frame-
117 Sousa, supra note 10, at 414.
8 See infra note 158 and accompanying text (block quote from Biltmore opinion).
119 Moreover, only six jurisdictions currently use a pure-form "reasonable expectations" ap-
proach to the interpretation of insurance contracts. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations:
Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of
Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 198 99 (1998). While some states employ variants on the
doctrine, other states, such as Idaho. Iowa, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and New Jersey have re-
jected the "reasonable expectations" doctrine outright. Id. at 195; see also Max True Plastering
Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861 (Okla. 1996) (discussing reasons for rejection of
the doctrine).
120 Sousa, supra note 10, at 404 (noting the "significance of this issue to the substantive laws of
bankruptcy. insurance, and corporations" and recognizing that "a framework is needed to provide
a more uniform application of the exclusion in future bankruptcy cases").
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work to determine its applicability is much preferable to a bright-line rule.1 22
Indeed, a rigid rule is incompatible with the contractual nature of insurance law
- a more flexible approach is needed to give voice to the formative parties in
interpreting their agreement.
This section provides a logical analytical framework to be employed by
courts in considering the true nature of the bankruptcy constituent in every case,
and in deciding whether to bar coverage for the claims they assert against corpo-
rate directors and officers under the "insured vs. insured" exclusion. With add-
ed predictability in this area, the risk that disputes over the exclusion will lead to
litigation are diminished, and costs to both insurers and insureds will decrease in
response. The suggested analysis carefully considers the relevant aspects of
bankruptcy law, insurance law, and contract interpretation as it uniquely per-
tains to D&O insurance agreements. By (1) assigning a presumption of applica-
bility or non-applicability based on the type of bankruptcy constituent involved,
and (2) considering two important factors that may serve to rebut the presump-
tion, courts will remain sensitive to the facts of each case while giving effect to
the central tenets of each interplaying body of law.
Before embarking on the task of such analysis, it is crucial for a court to
distinguish between two sets of claims that are typically asserted in bankruptcy
cases that implicate the "insured vs. insured" exclusion. 23 First, the bankruptcy
constituent asserts claims against the corporate directors and officer for the
commission of wrongful acts.1 24 These are to be characterized as the "underly-
ing claims."'125 Second, the bankruptcy constituent asserts that the directors and
officers have a claim against the D&O insurer for indemnification of any dam-
ages for loss arising from the prosecution of the underlying claims. Claims in
this second category are properly understood as the "insurance claims."'' 26 As
the RJ Reynolds court made clear, "[it is the source of the [bankruptcy consti-
tuent]'s standing to assert the underlying claims that determines whether there is
coverage under the policy.,,1 27 Such standing may accrue to the constituent by
way of an express directive issued by the pre-petition debtor, or by virtue of the
constituent's functional capacity as the creditors' representative. 1 28
122 Sousa, supra note 10, at 404 (citing Judge Posner in Level 3 Communications 168 F.3d at
958 ("A simple, flat rule is deliciously clear and easy to apply, but it may be both under-inclusive
and over-inclusive in relation to the purpose that animates it.")).
123 See, e.g., In re R.J. Reynolds, 315 B.R. 674, 678 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2003).
124 Id. In R.J Reynolds. the "wrongful acts" were specifically defined within the language of
the D&O policy. However, "wrongful acts" may also generally describe breaches of fiduciary
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The question as to how the bankruptcy constituent obtained standing to
bring the underlying claims has pivotal implications for the applicability or non-
applicability of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion. Generally, if the bankrupt-
cy constituent merely "stands in the shoes" of former corporate management,
the exclusion should be implicated.129 However, if its function is more akin to a
party representing and serving the interests of a debtor's bankruptcy estate, the
exclusion should normally not apply. 30 The exact character of a bankruptcy
constituent is often difficult to comprehend from a surface-level evaluation of
the facts appearing in any given case. Further, a cursory factual review will not
reveal whether a bankruptcy constituent was created as a result of the debtor's
unilateral volition. For these reasons, the proposed analysis takes thoughtful
instruction from the principles of bankruptcy, insurance, and contractual inter-
pretation to evaluate the particular facts and circumstances of each individual
transaction.
A. Step One.- Getting Our Bearings from the Bankruptcy Code
Step one of this Article's proposed analysis seeks to account for the re-
lationships between each bankruptcy constituent and an original debtor in ad-
dressing the "insured vs. insured" exclusion. By applying a rebuttable presump-
tion of applicability, or non-applicability, as to each constituent based on its role
under bankruptcy law, Step One answers concerns about collusion that the ex-
clusion is intended to address. The greater identity the constituent bears with
the original debtor, the stronger the presumption that collusion will occur, and
that the "insured vs. insured" exclusion should properly be invoked as a bar to
insurance coverage.
The filing of a bankruptcy petition has many important consequences
'3'for corporations with respect to the management of their assets., As men-
tioned, the filing of a petition creates a bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541 of
the Bankruptcy Code. 132 While the creation of a bankruptcy estate does not
expand or change a debtor's interest in its assets, it does change the party who
holds and administers the assets throughout the pendency of the bankruptcy
proceeding.1 33 Bankruptcy estates are most commonly administered by one of
two primary constituents: a "debtor-in-possession" or a bankruptcy trustee.1
34
129 Accord In re Buckeye Countrymark, Inc., 251 B.R. 835, 839 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002).
130 Id.
131 Sousa, supra note 10, at 415.
132 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). Section 541 provides that "[lt]he commencement of a case under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the follow-
ing property, wherever located and by whomever held: [e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and
(c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commence-
ment of the case." Id.
133 In re Sanders, 969 F.2d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 1992).
134 JEFF FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 143 50 (2007).
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In many cases, creditors' committees will oversee and participate in the admin-
istration of the estate.135 Each of these constituents has a different functional
status vis-Ai-vis the original debtor during liquidation or reorganization. How-
ever, all three forms of bankruptcy constituents may be entitled to bring claims
against corporate directors and officers for their wrongful acts in the administra-
tion of the bankruptcy estate. 137
1. Debtor-in-Possession -A Presumption of Applicability
The debtor-in-possession is a new legal entity that is created whenever a
debtor files a case under Chapters 11, 12, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. 138 The
debtor-in-possession conducts whatever negotiations precede the filing of a plan
of reorganization, and assumes responsibility for deploying the estate's assets
for the benefit of the debtor's creditors.1 39 Indeed, the debtor-in-possession is a
fiduciary whose duties flow to all parties interested in the bankruptcy estate. 
40
Given that a debtor-in-possession who assumes control of a bankruptcy
estate also assumes a heightened fiduciary duty to conserve and protect property
therein, some courts have concluded that a debtor-in-possession is not an "in-
sured" for the purposes of an "insured vs. insured" exclusion in a D&O policy.
For example, in Cigna Insurance Co. v. Gulf USA Corp., the court held that
because the debtor-in-possession assumed a fiduciary duty to Gulf's sharehold-
ers and creditors upon the filing its bankruptcy petition, the debtor-in-possession
was not an "insured" for the purposes of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion in
the D&O policy at issue. 141 In that case, the court compared the debtor-in-
135 Id. at 149.
136 The goal of a corporate reorganization is the confirmation and successful completion of a
"plan." which is the fruit of a process of negotiation among the debtor, creditors, and (in some
cases) equity interest holders. Id. at 730. In liquidation cases, the assets of the corporation are
sold and the entity ceases to exist in its pre-petition form. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2000).
137 In re Coleman, 426 F.3d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining the rights of a debtor-in-
possession); In re Molten Metal Technologies, Inc.. 271 B.R. 711. 726 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002)
(discussing the powers of creditors committees); Beiger v. Price Waterhouse, 81 B.R. 303. 304
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (the "trustee serves as the representative of the debtor").
138 FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 134, at 146-47.
139 Id. at 147. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) describes the duties of a debtor-in-possession as follows:
Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter and
to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor-in-
possession shall have all the rights, other than the right to compensation under
section 330 of this title, and power, and shall perform all the functions and du-
ties, except the duties specified in section 1106(a)(2),(3), and (4) of this title,
of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
140 Sousa, supra note 10. at 418 (citing In re Bowman, 181 B.R. 836, 843 (Bankr. D. Md.
1995)).
141 Cigna Ins. Co. v. Gulf USA Corp.. 1997 WL 1878757 (D. Idaho 1997), overruled by Bilt-
more Assoc., L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.. 572 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2009).
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possession to the FDIC in its role as a receiver for a failed bank. 142 The court
explained that
[i]n several instances, courts have concluded that a lawsuit by
the FDIC against the former directors and officers of a failed
bank was not subject to ... an insured vs. insured exclusion be-
cause the D&O action was brought on behalf of the creditors
and shareholders, and not on behalf of the insured, failed
bank. 143
Extending the analogy to the debtor-in-possession, who was bound to similar
duties under the Bankruptcy Code, the court held that the debtor-in-possession
was distinct from the pre-petition debtor and therefore not subject to the "in-
sured vs. insured" exclusion in Gulfs D&O policy. 1
44
Accepting that the estate and the debtor-in-possession are entities legal-
ly distinct from the pre-petition debtor according to legal formalism, decisions
from other courts reflect judicial concern about the practical realities of a deb-
tor-in-possession's identity. 145 While the term technically applies to the debtor
itself, it is universally used to describe the debtor's management.146 "Literally,
the debtor's management remains 'in possession' of the estate's property [in-
cluding cause of action against officers and directors] and remains responsible
for managing the estate's financial affairs while the case is pending." 147 Impor-
tantly, the debtor's managers are "the very same directors and officers who un-
questionably fall within the definition of 'insureds' under [a D&O policy]."'
148
Thus, notwithstanding the fiduciary duties imposed on a debtor-in-possession by
the Bankruptcy Code, some courts regard the distinction between a pre-petition
[O]nce Gulf entered bankruptcy. and assumed its status as a debtor-in-
possession, its relationship to its creditors and shareholders was subject to a
different set of legal obligations ... These obligations include a fiduciary re-
sponsibility to the creditors, and a duty to manage the property of the estate
for the benefit of the entire community of interest in the corporation-creditors
as well as stockholders.




145 "The distinction between a debtor and a debtor-in-possession is nuanced and unclear and
has yielded varying results in district courts [and] among the circuits .... The application of this
distinction to an insured vs. insured contract provision is more complex and has also yielded vary-
ing results." Biltmore Assoc., L.L.C. v. Twin City Fires Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56034
at * 13. n.4 (D. Ariz. 2006) aff'd on other grounds, Biltmore Assoc.. L.L.C., 572 F.3d 663 (9th Cir.
2009).
146 FERRIELL & JANGER. supra note 134, at 146.
147 Id.
148 Sousa, supra note 10, at 422.
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debtor and its debtor-in-possession as a creature of legal fiction that does not
exist in fact. 149
Arguably, the additional fiduciary duties assumed by debtors-in-
possession produce even higher risks that collusion will occur. As a fiduciary to
a bankruptcy estate, a debtor-in-possession has affirmative duties to maximize
available assets for the estate's beneficiaries by producing funds from wherever
they may be available. 50 This creates incentives for the debtor-in-possession to
bring claims in an effort to collect funds from the company's D&O insurer, as
those proceeds will augment the bankruptcy estate and decrease the original
debtor's ultimate liability to the extent that the debtor had a right to receive the
proceeds prior to filing for bankruptcy. 151 When considered as to a bankruptcy
constituent who is only fictionally distinct from the original debtor, the incen-
tive to generate insurance proceeds becomes an invitation for collusion between
the two. Since the "insured vs. insured" exclusion is directed toward precisely
this behavior, it should properly apply to a debtor-in-possession absent strong
evidence to the contrary.
A recent decision by the only circuit court to consider the issue reflects
a similar conclusion. In Biltmore Associates, L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Insurance
Co., the Ninth Circuit held that, for purposes of the "insured vs. insured" exclu-
sion, "the prefiling company [Visitalk] and the company as debtor in possession
in chapter 11 are the same entity." 152 Recognizing that the fact of bankruptcy
changes the interests of those who manage a debtor corporation, the court disa-
greed with the Gulf court about the transformative nature of a "debtor-in-
possession" designation. 53 The Biltmore court was straightforward in stating
that "[t]he differences in the fiduciary responsibilities of Visitalk's management
on account of bankruptcy ... do not make Visitalk a different entity for the pur-
poses of the insured vs. insured exclusion."'
' 54
149 Zilkha Energy Co. v. Leighton. 920 F.2d 1520. 1523 (10th Cir. 1990).
150 The status of debtor-in-possession imposes substantial responsibilities on the holder. The
most salient and central of these is the obligation to subordinate one's own financial interests to
those of one's creditors-the beneficiaries of the trust imposed by law upon the commencement of a
bankruptcy case. In re Burke, 147 B.R. 787. 800 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992); In re Spoor-Weston,
Inc., 139 B.R. 1009. 1016 17 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992). In the reorganization context, that obli-
gation translates to a duty to utilize the continuing possession of the assets of the estate so as to
promote creditors' interests in their value.
151 See In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51. 55 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Insurance policies are property of
the estate because, regardless of who the insured is, the debtor retains certain contract rights under
the policy itself. Any rights the debtor has against the insurer, whether contractual or otherwise.,
become property of the estate."). The overriding question when determining whether insurance
proceeds are property of the estate is whether the debtor would have a right to receive and keep
those proceeds when the insurer paid on a claim. However, when the debtor has no legally cog-
nizable claim to the insurance proceeds, those proceeds are not property of the estate. Id. at 55-
56.
152 Biltmore Assoc., 572 F.3d at 671.
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In presenting its reasoning, the Biltmore court struck at the heart of the
problem by acknowledging that "insured vs. insured" exclusions are not in-
cluded in D&O contracts in anticipation of bankruptcy.'5 5 Rather, they are in-
tended to control the cost of D&O insurance in the face of derivative sharehold-
er litigation.1 56 As the court explained, "if the exclusion were ignored, then
those companies who only want to pay for protection against third party claims
they cannot control would have to bear the additional financial burden [in the
form of higher premiums] of paying for claims over which companies have
more control." 157 The court refused to permit Visitalk's misuse of the exclusion
in its capacity as debtor-in-possession:
The liability insurance that the corporation and its principals
bought to protect against shareholders' derivative suits cannot
be turned into an available pot for the corporation's creditors by
enforcing the insurers' obligations while disregarding the par-
ties' agreement to limit those obligations to exclude insured
versus insured claims .... The alternative position would create
a perverse incentive for the principals of a failing business to
bet the dwindling treasury on a lawsuit against themselves and a
coverage action against their insurers, bailing the company out
with the money from the D&O policy if they win and giving
themselves covenants no to execute if they lose. That is among
the kinds of moral hazard that the insured versus insured exclu-
sion is intended to avoid. 
58
To give the exclusion its intended effect, and to adhere to the plain
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, the Biltmore court affirmed the court below in
holding that the Chapter 11 debtor-in-in possession were both "the insured" for
purposes of Visitalk's D&O policy. 1
59
For the reasons articulated by the Biltmore court, it is sensible to view
the debtor-in-possession as the same "entity" which existed before the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. The debtor-in-possession is the same as the debtor pre-
petition, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with the
property of the estate in a manner it would not have legally employed absent the
bankruptcy filing. 60 In short, the debtor-in-possession does not lose its factual
155 Id. at 668.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 669.
158 Biltmore, 572 F.3d at 674.
159 Id.
160 For example, the Code empowers a debtor-in-possession to avoid executory contracts and
unexpired leases. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000). Outside of bankruptcy. such action would expose the
debtor to liability for material breach of contract.
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identity with the pre-petition debtor upon filing for bankruptcy protection; in-
stead, the legal identity of corporate management is adjusted with the addition
of fiduciary duties.
To deal with the tension that arises when a debtor-in-possession asserts
a cause of action against its present or former directors and officers, the pro-
posed framework should lead to a rebuttable presumption that the debtor-in-
possession is an "insured" for the purposes of the "insured vs. insured" exclu-
sion. In transforming to a debtor-in-possession when the bankruptcy petition is
filed, a debtor does not take the form of a new and independent entity. Instead,
existing corporate management are vested with additional duties. Since these
duties do not alter the identity of the debtor in fact, the debtor-in-possession is
one and the same with the debtor and necessarily acts in concert therewith. Ac-
cordingly, the debtor-in-possession should be considered an "insured" both be-
fore and after the bankruptcy petition is filed.
2. The Bankruptcy Trustee - A Presumption of Non-
Applicability
The appointment of a bankruptcy trustee is governed by section 1104 of
the Bankruptcy Code. Under that section, in the event the court elects to enlist
the service of a bankruptcy trustee, the United States Trustee "shall appoint" a
"disinterested person" to administer the estate in the bankruptcy case. 161 Sec-
tion 101(14) of the Code defines "disinterested person" as a person that is not a
creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider; and who is not and was not
within two years before the date of the filing of the petition, a director, officer,
or employee of the debtor.1
62
Unlike a debtor-in-possession, who is most often personified by corpo-
rate managers who would be insured under the company's D&O policy pre-
petition, a bankruptcy trustee cannot hold such a position in a debtor corporation
under the Code's definition.1 63 The Code thus clearly contemplates that a trus-
tee in bankruptcy is not someone who would be "insured" by virtue of his rela-
tionship with the debtor before bankruptcy proceedings begin. Rather, the law
mandates that the trustee must have "no prior connection to either the debtor or
[the debtor's] creditors." 
64
161 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
162 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
163 A trustee is the "legal representative" and "fiduciary" of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 323
(providing that the trustee is the representative of the estate): In re Rigden, 795 F.2d 727, 730 (9th
Cir. 1986); In re Joseph, 208 B.R. 55, 60 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997); In re Mehr, 153 B.R. 430, 439
(Bankr. D. N.J. 1993). It follows that a bankruptcy trustee must have no interest adverse to the
estate and must not profit from her handling of the estate.
164 The trustee is "'is an independent person with no prior connection to either the debtor or the
creditors."' Joseph. 208 B.R. at 60 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Reed. 178 B.R. 817, 821
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995)).
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Despite the clear statutory indication that a trustee should normally not
be considered an "insured," courts have reached the opposite conclusion in re-
liance on the Code's description of the trustee's administrative role. For exam-
ple, in National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Olympia Holding Corp, the
court relied on the statement in section 1104 that "the bankruptcy estate includes
all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case."' 165 Citing Reliance Co. v. Weis, the court found that "[tihe bank-
ruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor corporation in prosecuting a
cause of action belonging to the debtor." 1 66 The Olympia Holding court contin-
ued by explaining that "[w]henever a cause of action 'belongs' to the debtor
corporation, the trustee simply has the authority to pursue the cause of action. 
167
However, the legal and equitable interests in the property rise no higher than
those of the debtor."'168 The court held that the trustee, acting in his capacity
under the Bankruptcy Code, "can only assert claims against the insureds that
belong to [the debtor corporation]. 169 Therefore, for purposes of this litigation,
there is no legal distinction between [the debtor] and the Trustee for the bank-
ruptcy estate." 1
70
Recognizing that Olympia Holding reflects a misunderstanding of the
Bankruptcy Code's intent in distinguishing between constituents, the court in In
re Buckeye Countrymark, Inc. found "very real differences between the Trustee
and the Debtor."
' 17 1
First and foremost, a bankruptcy trustee is a separate legal enti-
ty that neither represents the Debtor nor owes the Debtor a fidu-
ciary obligation. Instead, the Trustee's responsibility is to the
bankruptcy estate that he or she represents. As such, the Trus-
tee and the Debtor often take adversarial positions [regarding
the financial affairs of the debtor-corporation]. In these re-
spects, the Trustee and the Debtor are neither the same entity
nor alter egos of each other. 172
165 Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Olympia Holding Corp., 1996 VL 33415761, at *
7 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
166 Weis, 148 B.R at 580.
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Like the court in Cigna, the Buckeye Countrymark court also analogized
the bankruptcy trustee to the FDIC when it acts as a receiver for a failing
bank. 113 Citing Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Zandstra, 114 the Buck-
eye Countrymark court explained that "the FDIC, when acting as a receiver for a
failed institution in claims against the institutions officers and directors, carried
no threat of collusion and did not fall under the intent of the 'insured vs. in-
sured' exclusion."' Similarly, found the court, "when the plaintiff is not the
corporation but a bankruptcy trustee ... there is no threat of collusion." 1 76 Be-
cause "the intent behind an 'insured vs. insured' exclusion in [a D&O] policy is
to protect insurance companies against collusive suits between the insured cor-
poration and its insured officers and directors," the Buckeye Countrymark court
held that "the 'insured vs. insured' exclusion does not excuse insurance compa-
nies from coverage" when a suit is filed by an adverse bankruptcy trustee.'77
The United States Supreme Court also provided guidance as to the rela-
tionship between a debtor and the bankruptcy trustee in Commodity Futures
Trading v. Weintraub.' 8 That Court described the appointment of the bank-
ruptcy trustee as an event which "completely oust[s]" the debtor's manage-
ment. 179 While "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging manage-
ment authority over the debtor," the debtor's powers are "severely limited"
when the trustee assumes control of the business. 80 Therefore, unlike a debtor-
in-possession, a bankruptcy trustee is distinct from the debtor in his or her iden-
tity and as to his or her powers with respect to the bankruptcy estate.
Because a bankruptcy trustee and the debtor corporation are detached in
both fact and function, the trustee should be viewed in most cases as separate
and legally distinct from the debtor for the purposes of the "insured vs. insured"
exclusion. To accomplish this result, Step One of the proposed analysis should
produce a rebuttable presumption that militates non-applicability of the exclu-
sion when a bankruptcy trustee asserts claims against corporate directors and
officers. Since there is little danger that the debtor and the bankruptcy trustee
will conspire to bring lawsuits against the insured officers and directors, the
"insured vs. insured" exclusion is not necessary to protect against such collusive
behavior.
173 Id.
174 756 F. Supp. 429, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
175 Buckeye Countrymark. 251 B.R. at 840.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 841.
178 471 U.S. 343. 352 (1985).
179 Id. at 353.
180 Id. at 352.
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3. A Creditors' Committee - A Presumption of Non-
Applicability
For two specific but non-obvious reasons, an "insured vs. insured" ex-
clusion should not ordinarily apply to bar coverage for claims brought by a cred-
itors' committee. The first reason pertains to the identity of a creditors' com-
mittee under the Bankruptcy Code and the unique process by which the commit-
tee obtains standing to sue corporate officers and directors. The Bankruptcy
Code describes the role of the creditors' committee in section 1103(c):
A creditors' committee may
(1) Consult with the trustee or debtor-in-possession concerning
the administration of the case;
(2) Investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial
conditions of the debtor, the operation of the debtors business
and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any
other matter relevant to the case or to formulation of the plan;
(3) Participate in the formulation of a plan;
(4) Request the appointment of a trustee or examiner; and
(5) Perform such other services as are in interest of those
represented. 181
The purpose of providing these duties to a creditors' committee
is to serve as a check on managerial powers in circumstances
where a bankruptcy trustee is not appointed, and to 'ensure that
the debtor-in-possession maximizes the value of the estate in-
stead of promoting the interest of any one constituency,' or
even its own self interest. 
82
The Code, thus, envisions the creditors' committee as fulfilling a supervisory
role, where it assists in the formulation of the terms of the debtor's proposed
plan of reorganization or liquidation. 1
83
Since the role of a creditors' committee only involves overseeing the
administration of the bankruptcy estate, it follows that the actual administrative
duties are performed by an entity that is not the creditors' committee. Instead,
181 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (2000).
182 Sousa, supra note 10, at 311.
183 FERRIELL & JANGER. supra note 134, at 149.
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the Bankruptcy Code directs that such responsibilities will be borne by "one of
two participants: a trustee, or a debtor-in-possession. ' 1 4 Moreover, the Code
does not confer standing to sue upon a creditors' committee. 85 Where a credi-
tors' committee oversees the actions of a corporate debtor-in-possession, there-
fore, the debtor-in-possession will assume the task of bringing suit against cor-
porate directors and officers for their managerial transgressions, not the credi-
tors' committee. In these circumstances, the applicability of an "insured vs.
insured" exclusion to a creditors' committee is moot. The committee does not
appear as a party to the litigation, and can thus never be considered an "insured"
who sues another "insured" for the purposes of the exclusion.
Under some circumstances, however, a creditors' committee may obtain
derivative standing to sue corporate directors and officers for their wrongful
acts. To do so, the creditors' committee must satisfy four prerequisite condi-
tions:
(1) The asserted claim must be "colorable;"
(2) The committee must make a demand on the debtor-in-
possession to bring the action;
(3) The debtor-in-possession must have refused unjustifiably to
pursue the claim; and
(4) The committee must first obtain leave to sue from the bank-
ruptcy court. 
186
Thus, in order to obtain derivative standing, the debtor-in-possession
must have unjustifiably refused to pursue the claim despite demand by the credi-
tors' committee. The committee's standing to sue, therefore, depends for its
existence on adversity between the debtor-in-possession and the committee re-
garding the claim the committee asserts.' 8' Any possibility that the suit results
from collusive action between the committee and the debtor-in-possession is
thus greatly diminished by necessary implication. Therefore, even in circums-
tances where a creditors' committee is a party to litigation against directors and
184 Id.
185 Cirka v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh. Pa.. 2004 WL 1813283, at *6 (Del. Ch.
2004) ("Neither Section 1103(c)(5) nor Section 109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code Creates a Direct
Right of Creditors' Committees to Bring Suit.").
186 Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000): In re Gibson Group, Inc.. 66 F.3d 1436.
1441-42 (6th Cir. 1995).
187 See In re J.F.D. Enters., Inc., 223 B.R. 610, 623 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) ("[C]reditors'
committee[s] . . . owe no duty to the [bankruptcy] debtor or to the estate." (quoting In re Micro-
board Processing, Inc.. 95 B.R. 283, 285 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989))); In re Daig Corp.. 17 B.R. 41.
43 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) ("The committee ... will aid, assist, and monitor the debtor pursuant
to its own self-interest.") (emphasis added).
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officers of a corporation, the "insured vs. insured" exclusion should not operate
to bar recovery where liability is discovered.1 88
Second, because a creditors' committee represents a group that is not
insured under a corporate D&O policy, it cannot logically be considered an "in-
sured" when it sues to vindicate corporate rights for the benefit of uninsured
parties (creditors of the insured). Plainly, and because creditors are not "insu-
reds" within the meaning of D&O policies issued to the debtor, a derivative suit
by a committee that represents creditors is not brought by an "insured." The
committee's initiation of a derivative lawsuit does not render the creditor pool
"insured," it merely allows the committee to vindicate the rights of the insured
corporation for the benefit of the uninsured creditor pool. Since the creditors'
committee is never transformed into an "insured" when it sues in its derivative
capacity, the "insured vs. insured" exclusion should ordinarily not apply to ac-
tions brought by a creditors' committee.
The court in Cirka v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania'" recognized both aforementioned reasons as relevant in its deci-
sion to deny summary judgment in favor of an insurer who denied coverage for
liabilities incurred by the former directors and officers of a bankrupt health care
corporation on the basis of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion.19 In that case, a
committee of the debtor corporation's unsecured creditors successfully peti-
tioned the bankruptcy court to allow it to sue the former directors and officers
for various breaches of their fiduciary duties to the corporation, including the
issuance of improper compensation packages.' 91 The Delaware Chancery Court
framed the issues as to whether a creditors' committee that had properly ob-
tained standing to initiate action that could have been brought by a debtor-in-
possession necessarily brings that action "on behalf of' the debtor-in-
possession. 192
Recognizing that the claims made in the underlying action were claims
that belonged to the corporation prior to the bankruptcy - and to the debtor's
estate following the filing of the bankruptcy - the court explained that it is the
trustee in bankruptcy that becomes the representative of the debtor's estate. 193
In contrast, the creditors' committee is created by the Bankruptcy Code to pro-
188 Accord Cirka, 2004 WL 1813283, at *5 ("the [c]ommittee itself is an independent entity
created by federal statute").
189 Id.
190 Id. The exclusion provided that "[t]he Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for
Loss in connection with a Claim made against an Insured: (i) which is brought by or on behalf of
any Insured or the Company: or which is brought by any security holder or member of the Com-
pany. whether directly or derivatively. unless such security holder's or member's Claim is insti-
gated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of. or assistance of.
or active participation of. or intervention of, any Director or Officer or the Company." Id. at *2.
191 Id. at *3.
192 Id. at *4.
193 Id. at *5.
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vide an additional check on the management of the estate. 194 Characterizing the
underlying suit as derivative in nature, the Cirka court held that, although the
committee brought a suit that could have been asserted by the debtor-in-
possession, there was no doubt that the committee did not bring the action on
behalf of the debtor-in-possession. 195 Rather, the committee simply sought to
enforce rights belonging to the estate that the debtor-in-possession could also
have enforced. 1
96
The result achieved in Cirka finds further support from principles of
public policy that animate corporate law's accommodation of derivative suits.
Typically, shareholders are permitted derivative standing for the purpose of pro-
tecting their investments against the misguidance of corporate directors and
officers. 197 In bankruptcy, where equity is non-existent or severely impaired,
creditors replace shareholders as the de facto beneficiaries of whatever assets
remain. 98 The Bankruptcy Code effectively preserves the "watchdog" function
once performed by equity shareholders by allowing creditors' committees to sue
derivatively where equity in assets no longer exists. Given the anti-collusive
intent of "insured vs. insured" exclusions, the fiduciary constituent charged with
overseeing the debtor corporation in its management of its bankruptcy estate
clearly falls outside the exclusion's purview.199 Accordingly, Part One of the
proposed analysis should yield a presumption of non-applicability where an
"insured vs. insured" exclusion is considered as to a committee comprised of the
debtor's creditors.
194 id; accord In re AKF Foods, Inc.. 36 B.R. 288, 289 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The function
of a creditors' committee is to act as a watchdog on behalf of the larger body of creditors which it
represents.").
195 Cirka, 2004 WL 1813283, at *7.
196 Id.
197 First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1999):
Bansbach v. Zinn, 801 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y. 2003) (noting that derivative actions serve the important
purpose of protecting corporations and minority shareholders against officers and directors who,
in discharging their official responsibilities, place other interests ahead of those of the corpora-
tion).
198 As a general rule, in deciding whether a claim should be equitably subordinated, a bankrupt-
cy court will prefer claims of innocent general creditors over a claim of a shareholder or subordi-
nated creditor deceived by officers of a corporation. 11 U.S.C. § 510 (2000); see, e.g., In re Struc-
turlite Plastics Corp., 224 B.R. 27, 35-36 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Stirling Homex
Corp., 579 F.2d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979)) (upholding bank-
ruptcy court's "subordination of the former shareholders' claims to [those] of general unsecured
creditors").
199 See also Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 327 B.R. 561, 573 (W.D. Pa.
2005) ("Reflection upon the fact that the members of the unsecured creditors committee are in fact
selected from the class of unsecured creditors strengthens the rationale for the existence of a fidu-
ciary relationship among the committee members as they are serving each other as well as the
unsecured creditors not selected as members of the committee.").
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B. Step Two: On the Lookout for Rebuttal Evidence
Courts should consider two primary factors that may serve to rebut or
buttress the presumptive inference that arose in the first stage of the analysis.
The first and most important factor involves examination of the written con-
tract. Since insurance law is, in substantial part, the law of contractual interpre-
tation,0 0 the policy itself should be given appropriate consideration by a court
that undertakes to properly apply its exclusions. Second, courts should inquire
as to the circumstances under which the bankruptcy trustee took control of the
estate, and what role the pre-petition debtor played in effecting that transition.
1. The Contract: A Careful Map of the Agreement
As the court in Molten Metal explained, "[k]nowing the general purpose
[of the contract] does not tell us precisely how the parties intended to accom-
plish it."'20 ' Thus, a court's primary objective in interpreting the language in
insurance agreements is to ascertain and to give effect to the intention of the
202parties as expressed in the agreement. Courts have conclusively established
that insurance policies are subject to the same rules of construction applicable to
203other types of contracts. However, many court decisions rendered on the
basis of language contained in insurance contracts cannot be cogently explained
by reference to ordinary principles of interpretation.2 4
For instance, in North Pacific Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, the Supreme Court
of Oregon addressed the question of whether a provision in the exclusions sec-
tion of a motor vehicle liability policy operated to reduce liability coverage for
an injured insured. 20' The insureds argued that "Exclusion 10,,2o6 was incom-
200 See John Randolph Prince, I1, Where No Minds Meet: Insurance Policy Interpretation and
the Use of Drafting History, 18 VT. L. REv. 409 (1994).
201 In re Molten Metal Technologies, Inc., 271 B.R. 711, 728 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
202 Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 313 N.E.2d 374 (Ohio 1974); accord Southern Atl. Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Middleton, 562 S.E.2d 482. 484 85 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002).
203 Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv. Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 285-86 (I1. 2006)
(relying on Cont'l Cas. Co. v. McDowell & Colantoni, Ltd., 668 N.E.2d 59 (I1. 1996) (delineating
the traditional rules of contract interpretation)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 202 207. General principles of contract interpretation direct that where competing claims are
made about the meaning of a contract, one must determine whether an ambiguity exists. In re-
solving an ambiguity, a court must assess the competing interpretations offered by the parties and
decide which is to be preferred taking into account the "plain meaning" of the words. If the mean-
ing is not sufficiently plain, the concept of contra proferentum militates to interpretation against
the drafter. This allows the court a way to shift the calculus in favor of the parties with less know-
ledge and bargaining power where there is otherwise no basis for preferring one party's view over
the other. Id.
204 JERRY, supra note 2, at 155.
205 22 P.3d 739 (Or. 2001).
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prehensible, while the insurer argued that the provision "clearly... limits cov-
erage to the insureds.,, 20 7 To resolve the dispute, the court approved and ex-
tended the traditional doctrine of contra proferentum, explaining that
any reasonable doubt as to the intended meaning of [the term]
will be resolved against the insurance company and in favor of
extending coverage to the insured .... [W]hen [a] term in an
insurance policy is ambiguous, [the] court will interpret it ac-
cording to [the] perceived understanding of [an] ordinary pur-
chaser of insurance.2 °8
Applying this analysis, the court held that:
It is the insurer's burden to draft exclusions and limitations that
are clear. In this case, the ordinary purchaser of insurance
would not be able to determine what Exclusion 10 means and,
more particularly, would not be able to determine that it is
meant to reduce the limits of liability for certain claimants be-
low the amount that appears on the declarations page. Under
such circumstances, and having used all the [traditional] me-
thods for resolving the dispute in this case, we construe the pol-
icy against North Pacific, the party that drafted it. Under that
construction, defendants are entitled to liability coverage in ...
the amount provided on the declarations page of the policy.
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise.20 9
North Pacific reflects a majority view that basic rules of contract inter-
pretation apply to insurance agreements, but may be extended to impose heigh-
tened burdens on the drafters thereof.
Professor James Fischer 210 shares this view, describing the special rules
of insurance contract interpretations as "build [ing] on general rules applicable to
all contracts" but which are "more than simple extensions of the basic rules of
contract" and which "often have a significant twist., 21  Recognizing that "the
rule of contra proferentum is literally the same between the insurance rule and
206 "For bodily injury or property damage to you or any family member to the extent that the
limits of liability for this coverage exceed the limits of liability required by the Oregon financial
responsibility law." Id. at 741 (emphasis removed).
207 Id. at 742.
208 Id. (citing Shadbolt v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 551 P.2d 478 (Or. 1976)).
209 Id. at 744.
210 Professor of Law, Southern University School of Law, Los Angeles, California. Fischer is
cited with approval in JERRY, supra note 2, at 154-57.
211 James M. Fischer. Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?:
Text Versus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 995, 1003 (1992).
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the basic contract rule," Fischer posits that "[s]ome insurance rules do not have
a strict basic contract rule counterpart., 21 2 To refine and explain his point,
Fischer identifies three rules of insurance contract interpretation that have
emerged in precedent but that have no counterpart in general contract law: (1)
contract terms providing coverage will be construed liberally whereas terms
restricting coverage (exclusions) will be construed narrowly; (2) the language of
the insurance contract is to be construed in accordance with the reasonable un-
derstanding of a layperson; and (3) if semantically possible, the contract will be
construed so as to achieve its objective of securing indemnity to the insured for
the losses to which the insurance relates. z 3
In effect, Fischer suggests that where general contract law searches for
the "mutual intent" of the contracting parties, insurance contract law focuses on
one party to the contract - the insured z  The analytical result of Fischer's
logic is "one rule for coverage terms [and a] different rule for exclusions. 2 15
The practical result, however, expresses a "profound pro-insured bias - one so
great that courts will rely on it to reach results that are unimaginable elsewhere
in the law of contracts.2 z 6
When applied to interpret an "insured vs. insured" exclusion in bank-
ruptcy, Fischer's non-traditional rules of construction have two unique implica-
tions. First, because the exclusion functions to restrict coverage, it will undergo
narrow interpretation by courts and fail to bar coverage where such a result is
reasonable.2 7 Second, because the question of whether a bankruptcy constitu-
ent falls within the definition of an "insured" under a D&O policy involves a
matter of semantics, Fischer's third rule begs for an additional measure of le-
niency in favor of granting coverage where a bankruptcy constituent asserts
claims on behalf of the estate. Taken together, these two factors suggest that
where an "insured vs. insured" exclusion lacks specific language barring claims
asserted in bankruptcy, the provision should be judicially construed to allow for
coverage.
Even where "insured vs. insured" exclusions are explicitly non-
applicable to bankruptcy constituents, moral hazard concerns may militate
against observance of that language.21 8 In the event an insured is encouraged to
exercise only minimal amounts of loss avoidance in the zone of insolvency, a
212 Id. at 1003 04.
213 Id. at 1004-05.
214 Id. at 1005.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1007.
217 See Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp.. 704 F. Supp 898, 902
(E.D. Ark. 1989). To the extent that D&O policies are contracts of adhesion, the law finds addi-
tional support for interpretation against the drafter, the party with superior bargaining power.
JERRY, supra note 2, at 160; Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Iowa
2005).
218 See Fischer, supra note 211, at 1058.
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court may find that public policy demands disregard of the explicit language
contained in the exclusion. By allowing moral hazards to negate the effects of
contractual language, the rules of interpretation support the law of insurance in
addressing one of its primary concerns. Thus, D&O policies enjoy an added
safeguard against mismanagement in bankruptcy - the life raft of indemnifica-
tion will be unavailable to those who rely on its rescue to the detriment of the
estate.
To conclude, unless a contract specifically bars recovery from claims
asserted by a bankruptcy constituent or the insurer stands to fall victim to a
moral hazard, a court should ordinarily interpret an "insured vs. insured" clause
to favor the provision of coverage for claims asserted under a D&O policy.
2. How Did We Get Here? Re-Charting the Crooked Path
The final question to be answered in analyzing the applicability of an
"insured vs. insured" exclusion in the bankruptcy context provides explanation
for the divergent holdings in R.J Reynolds and Molten Metal. 19 In R.J. Rey-
nolds, the court's primary concern was whether the administrating constituent
may be said to have brought the action without the "solicitation, assistance, or
participation" of the debtor.2 0 The court answered the question in the negative
because the debtor in that case created a legal entity to sue on behalf of the cred-
itors through confirmation of its Chapter I I reorganization plan. 22' The plan
provided for the creation of a "Trust" and designated Roy Terry, Jr. as the
"Trustee." 222 The plan also provided that the debtor would transfer to the Trust
all claims against directors and officers on or before the date of confirmation.
223
When the Trustee in R.J Reynolds sought a declaration that the direc-
tors and officers were entitled to indemnification under the corporate D&O poli-
cy, the court ruled that coverage was excluded under the "insured vs. insured"
224provision. In so holding, the court reasoned that "[tihe provision in the Plan
that transferred any claims against [the directors and officers] from the Debtor
to the Trust, and the Trustee, constituted a voluntary assignment of these claims
219 Discussed supra Part i1.
220 In re R.J. Reynolds, 315 B.R. 674. 682 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2003).
221 Id. A corporation filing under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code seeks to capture and
preserve its "going concern" value through reorganization. The reorganization is achieved
through the debtor's successful completion of a Chapter 11 plan, which is the fruit of a process of
negotiation among the debtor, creditors, and other equity holders. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra
note 134, at 762. To be given legal effect, however, the plan must be confirmed by the court.
Confirmation will be granted only if the plan complies with the applicable provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2000).
222 R.J Reynolds, 315 B.R. at 676.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 682.
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to the trustee by contract. 2 25 The court found that unlike a situation where a
bankruptcy trustee is involuntarily appointed by the court, the voluntary transfer
of claims through the plan required the "solicitation, assistance, and participa-
tion" of the debtor. 26
In considering the applicability of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion
where the debtor was involved in the assignment of claims, the RJ Reynolds
court found guidance from the only other court that had previously considered
an analogous pattern of facts. In In re Pintlar, a debtor-in-possession filed a
complaint against former directors and officers of the debtor. 227 The debtor
then assigned those claims under a trust agreement to the debtor's president and
other unnamed officials. 22 8 The debtor's plan of reorganization provided that
these individuals would serve as "litigation trustees," who would bring the as-
signed claims on behalf of the estate.2 29 The Pintlar court found that "the exclu-
sion cannot be avoided by the process of assigning the claims to another entity
merely for the purpose of avoiding the exclusion., 230  Employing the Pintlar
rationale, the RJ Reynolds court found that "the debtor's voluntary creation of
the trust and assignment of [the claims] does not permit either the debtor or the
trustee to circumvent the ['insured vs. insured'] exclusion.2 31
The policy concerns that give rise to the inclusion of "insured vs. in-
sured" exclusions in corporate D&O policies lend support to the holdings in
Pintlar and RJ Reynolds. As the R.J. Reynolds court recognized,
225 Id. at 678.
226 Id. at 682. "In most [corporate] reorganizations .... no trustee is appointed to take over the
management of the debtor's affairs" as that task is usually assumed by a debtor-in-possession.
The appointment of a trustee "generally occurs only when both the creditors and the court have
lost faith in the ability of incumbent management to turn the business around .... I d. In such
cases, the court is "empowered to displace current management by appointing a trustee."
FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 134, at 709-10 (relying on In re Bonneville Pac. Corp., 196 B.R.
868 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996) ("requiring disgorgement of fees paid to attorneys who represented the
debtor-in-possession, due to mismanagement of the debtor's affairs")).
227 In re Pintlar, 205 B.R. 945 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997). overruled by Biltmore, 572 F.3d 663.
228 Id. at 946-47.
229 Id. at 947.
230 Id. The court in Pintlar did rule that the litigation trustees could proceed with the prosecu-
tion of the claims against the directors and officers as representatives of the creditors in a deriva-
tive action. There was no discussion concerning whether an exclusion applied to the litigation
trustees in that capacity. Id.
231 R.J Reynolds, 315 B.R. at 679.
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[I]nsurers require that [such] clauses be included in D&O poli-
cies to avoid the possibility of collusion between the corpora-
tion and the directors and officers. . . . In a case in which the
debtor voluntarily transfers the cause of action to a third party,
there is the distinct possibility of collusion between the debtor
and the directors and officers.232
The R. Reynolds court thus found that the "insured vs. insured" exclu-
sion should apply to address the "distinct possibility" of collusion and coverage
was accordingly denied.233
The contractual assignment of claims that appeared in Pintlar and R.J
Reynolds is only one mechanism by which debtors may attempt to avoid appli-
cability of "insured vs. insured" exclusions in D&O policies. Only the limits of
creativity constrain the number of ways in which debtors may "solicit, assist, or
participate" in the assertion of claims against directors and officers.234 There-
fore, the last step of the proposed analysis asks broad questions about the deb-
tor's involvement in the bringing of claims that might entitle the estate to in-
demnification under a D&O policy. 235 If, as in R. Reynolds, the inquiry re-
veals that the debtor has been improperly instrumental in the arrangement, then
the possibility that collusion has occurred should rebut a presumption that the
"insured vs. insured" exclusion should not bar claims asserted on behalf of the
bankruptcy estate.
CONCLUSION
The analytical framework proposed in this Article cogently explains the
incongruent holdings in Molten Metal and RJ Reynolds, and provides a sound
mechanism by which "insured vs. insured" provisions may be evaluated in
bankruptcy cases. In identifying collusion in a systematic way and applying
"insured vs. insured" exclusions to deny coverage where it exists, courts may
vindicate the public interest in punishing and deterring impropriety in connec-
tion with bankruptcy proceedings. The analysis proposed in this Article gives
appropriate effect to the primary intent of "insured vs. insured" exclusions by
effectively addressing collusion as a moral hazard arising from the presence of
D&O insurance.
232 Id. at 680-81.
233 Id.
234 Hurley v. Columbia Cas. Co., 976 F. Supp 268. 276 (D. Del. 1997) ("Complicating the
liquidation scenario is a possibility that the fertile mind of the bankruptcy practitioner might come
up with other devices to directly avoid the consequences of the 'Insured v. Insured' exclusion.").
235 These questions explore the debtor's pre-petition and post-petition relationships with its
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In addition, the suggested two-step method creates an environment in
which judges, contract drafters, and litigants may all understand the implications
of bankruptcy and insurance law at their convergence in D&O liability policies.
All such parties are thus empowered with a clear view of the horizon, and may
chart their independent courses through the bankruptcy process with an added
measure of confidence - for amidst insolvency's choppy and uncharted waters,
certainty regarding the "insured vs. insured" exclusion will provide for smoother
sailing.
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